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ARCHITECTURAL CONTROL JUSTIFIED ON THE BASIS OF PROPERTY
VALUE PROTECTION
State ex rel. Stoyanoff v. Berkeley, 458 S. W.2d 305 (Mo. 1970)
Respondent Stoyanoff applied to appellant Building Commissioner
for a permit to build a pyramid-shaped residence in Ladue, Missouri, a
wealthy suburb of St. Louis. The adjoining neighborhood consists
almost exclusively of two-story houses of Colonial, French Provincial,
and English design. The permit was refused on the grounds that the plans
were not approved by the city's Architectural Board. The Board was
charged with a task of denying permits to buildings and structures which
it judged grotesque, unsightly, or detrimental to property values.'
The trial court issued a peremptory writ of mandamus to compel the
issuance of the permit on the ground that the restrictions placed on the
use of property by ordinances deprived the owners of their property
without due process of law. On appeal, respondent contended that the
ordinances in question, since they were based entirely on aesthetic
considerations, exceeded the authority of the enabling legislation,
sanctioned an unconstitutional exercise of the police power and failed to
provide adequate standards for the delegation of legislative power. Held:
The ordinances are a valid exercise of the police power because they
protect property values as well as the beauty of the area. 2
The Ladue architectural control ordinances are similar to those
adopted in many municipalities.3 Although in all but a few states such
ordinances are based on substantially similar enabling legislation,'
Missouri appears to be one of the few states to have declared such
I. Ordinance 131, as amended by Ordinance 281 of that city, purports to set up an
Architectural Board to approve plans and specifications for buildings and structures erected
with the city and in a premble to "conform to certain minimum architectural standards of
appearance and conformity with surrounding structures, and that unslightly, grotesque and
unsuitable structures, detrimental to the stability of value and the welfare of surrounding
property, structures and residents and to the general welfare and happiness of the
community, be avoided, and that appropriate standards of beauty and conformity be
fostered and encouraged.'
State ex rel. Stoyanoffv. Berkeley, 458 S.W.2d 305, 306-07 (Mo. 1970).
2. 458 S.W.2d 305 (Mo. 1970). For an excellent discussion of this case see Mandelker, Stoyanoff.
Back to the Barricades, 22 ZONING DIGEST 288a (1970). In as much as the case was originally heard
on a motion for summary judgment, the merits of Stoyanoff's design under the standards contained
in the Ladue ordinance were never litigated.
3. 458 S.W.2d at 307-08. See also Anderson, Architectural Controls, 12 SYRACUSE L. REv. 26,
29 (1960).
4. R. ANDERSON, I AMERICAN LAWS OF ZONING § 7-16 at 510 (1968) [hereinafter cited as
ANDERSON].
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ordinances invalid for exceeding the enabling act.5 In State ex rel.
Magidson v. Henze,' an architectural control ordinance was declared
void because Section 89.020 of the Missouri enabling act 7 obviously
"'does not grant to the city the right to impose upon the land owner
aesthetic controls for the buildings he chooses to erect."' 8 The Berkeley
court finds Henze in error for not considering Section 89.040 in
conjunction with 89.020.1 The former section specifies that land use
regulations should consider the character of the district involved and the
effect on property values. The court holds, essentially, that any police
power land use regulation is valid if it promotes the general welfare by
advancing the interests articulated in Section 89.040. Thus, if
architectural control ordinances promote the general welfare, they are
authorized by the Missouri enabling act. 0
The constitutional test for restrictions on the use of private property
5. But see Piscitelli v. Township Comm. of the Township of Scotch Plains, 103 N.J. Super. 589,
248 A.2d 274 (1968); see also Henley, Beautiful as Well as Sanitary-Architectural Controls by
Municipalities, 59 ILL. BAR. J. 36,41 (1970).
6. 342 S.W.2d 261 (Mo. App. 1961).
7. Mo. REV. STAT. § 89.020 (1969) provides:
For the purpose of promoting health, safety, morals, or the general welfare of the
community, the legislative body of all cities, towns, and villages is hereby empowered to
regulate and restrict the height, number of stories, and size of buildings, and other structures,
the percentage of lot that may be occupied, the size of yards, courts, and other open spaces,
the density of population, the preservation of features of historical significance, and the
location and use of buildings, structures, and land for trade, industry, residence or other
purpose.
8. 342 S.W.2d at 265.
9. Such regulations shall be made in accordance with a comprehensive plan and designed to
lessen congestion in the streets; to secure safety from fire, panic and other dangers; to
promote health and general welfare; to provide adequate air and light; to prevent the
overcrowding of land; to avoid undue concentration of population; to preserve features of
historical significance; to facilitate the adequate provision of transportation, water,
sewerage, schools, parks, and other public requirements. Such regulations shall be made
with reasonable consideration, among other things, to character of the district and its
peculiar suitability for particular uses, and with a view of conserving the values of buildings
and encouraging the most appropriate use of land throughout such municipality.
Mo. REv. STAT. § 89.040 (1969).
10. This holding is significant because, although most states have similar enabling acts, the
particular states which have decided the architectural control question have statutory language
somewhat broader than the Missouri statute. Ohio expressly allows municipalities to control
building design. OHio REV. CODE § 713.04 (1954). Wisconsin provides, after language similar to
that in note 7 supra, that the section "shall be liberally construed in favor of the city and as
minimum requirements adopted for the purposes stated. It shall not be deemed limitation (sic) of
any power elsewhere granted. Wisc. STAT. ANN., § 62.23(7a) (1957). Illinois gives municipalities
the right to "prohibit uses, buildings or structures incompatible with the character of such
districts." ILL. REV. STAT., ch. 24 § 11.13-1 (1969).
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1971/iss1/6
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is one of reasonableness." The ordinance will be sustained unless its
"provisions are clearly arbitrary and unreasonable, having no
substantial relation to the public health, morals, or general welfare. '"'
Traditionally, aesthetic considerations alone have not been considered
sufficient to justify exercise of the police power,'3 however, the mere
presence of aesthetic considerations in juxtaposition with more
recognized objectives will not invalidate police power legislation. 4
Courts, in order to uphold primarily aesthetic regulation, have often
strained their imagination to find grounds of health, safety, and morality
on which to base their decisions. 5 The trend has been toward allowing
aesthetic control, but the courts' dicta concerning aesthetics has usually
been accompanied by holdings on economic grounds." Today, two
jurisdictions have recognized aesthetics alone as a valid justification for
exercise of the police power. 1' More often, aesthetic control or zoning
ordinances have been upheld because they protected such interests as
historical buildings or areas," tourism, 9 or, as in the instant case,
property values.2 0
Many arguments have been advanced for the judicial reluctance to
1I. City of St. Paul v. Chicago, St. P., M. & 0. Ry., 413 F.2d 762 (8th Cir. 1969).
12. Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 395 (1926).
13. West Palm Beach v. State ex rel. Duffy, 158 Fla. 863, 30 So.2d 491 (1947); Anderson v.
Shackleford, 74 Fla. 36, 76 So. 343 (1917); see also Steiner, The Law of Zoning in Missouri, 24
WASH. U.L.Q. 193 (1939).
14. Welch v. Swasey, 214 U.S. 91 (1909).
15. Comment, Aesthetic Control of Land Use: A House Built Upon the Sand?, 59 Nw. U.L.
REv. 372 (1964). One of the most extreme cases is St. Louis Gunning Advertising Co. v. City of St.
Louis, 235 Mo. 99, 137 S.W. 929 (1911). In St. Louis Gunning Advertising Co., the Missouri
Supreme Court upheld an ordinance that prohibited advertising billboards because "they endanger
the public health, promote immorality, constitute hiding places for criminals and all classes
miscreants." Id. at 145, 137 S.W. at 942.
16. Note, Aesthetic Zoning: A Current Evaluation of the Law, 18 U. FLA. L. REv. 430, 437
(1965).
17. People v. Stover, 12 N.Y.2d 462, 191 N.E.2d 272, 240 N.Y.S.2d 734, appeal dismissed, 375
U.S. 42 (1963); Oregon City v. Hartke, 240 Ore. 35,400 P.2d 255 (1965).
18. Neef v. Springfield, 380 I1l. 275,43 N.E.2d 947 (1942); New Orelans v. Levy, 223 La. 14, 64
So. 2d 798 (1953); Opinion of the Justices, 333 Mass. 773, 128 N.E.2d 557 (1955); Town of Dearing
ex rel. Bittenbender v. Tibbets, 105 N.H. 481, 202 A.2d 232 (1964); Santa Fe v. Gamble, Skogmo,
Inc., 73 N.M.2d 410, 389 P.2d 13 (1964).
19. Sunad, Inc. v. City of Sarasota, 122 So.2d 611 (Fla. 1960); Miami Beach v. Ocean and
Island Co., 147 Fla. 480, 35 So.2d 384 (1941); Opinion of Justices, 103 N.H. 268, 169 A.2d 762
(1961); Santa Fe v. Gamble, Skogmo, Inc., 73 N.M. 410,38 P.2d 13 (1964).
20. State ex rel. Civillo v. City of New Orleans, 154 La. 271, 97 So.2d 440 (1923); United
Advertising Corp. v. Borough of Metuchen, 42 N.J. 1, 198 A.2d 447 (1964); State ex rel. Saveland
Park Holding Corp. v. Wieland, 269 Wis. 262, 69 N.W.2d 217, cert. denied, 350 U.S. 841 (1955).
For the status of aesthetic zoning in the different states, see Note, Aesthetic Zoning: A Current
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sanction purely aesthetic control.2 The most important reason is
probably the difficulty of formulating adequate standards for
determining aesthetic values,2 especially when historical or touristic
considerations are absent. It is obvious, for example, that the
preservation of New Orelans Vieux Carre or Santa Fe Spanish
architecture advances the general welfare of those communities. In
contrast, it is more difficult to determine whether a particular house will
affect the beauty or architectural integrity of a residential area. As a
consequence, courts in the latter situation, have generally avoided the
problem by relying on property values.23
Except for the tourism and historical district cases, there has been
little litigation on the constitutionality of architectural control
ordinances. 2' Except for Henze, the cases which invalidate such
ordinances do so because of arbitrary or insufficient standards; they do
not reach the question of purely aesthetic standards. 25 The two
Evaluation of the Law, 18 U. FLA. L. REV. 430,437-38 (1965); Marotti & Selfon, Aesthetic Zoning
and the Police Power, 46 J. OF URBAN L. 774, 778 (1969).
21. Other reasons which may explain the reluctance of courts to sanction aesthetic controls are:
(I) the possibility of descriminating enforcement; (2) the difficulty of drafting precise legislation;
and, (3) the possibility that such legislation will stifle creativity if and innovation in the area
regulated. Comment, Zoning, Aesthetics and the First Amendment, 64 COLUM. L. REv. 81,'84
(1964).
22. People v. Stover, 12 N.Y.2d 465, 470-71, 191 N.E.2d 272, 277, 240 N.Y.S.2d 734, 740-741
(1963) (Van Voorhis dissenting); Presnell v. Leslie, 3 N.Y.2d 384, 394, 144 N.E.2d 381, 387, 165
N.Y.S.2d 488, 497 (1957) (Van Voorhis, J., dissenting); Dukeminer, Zoning for Aesthetic Objec-
tives: A Reappraisal, 20 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 218, 225 (1955).
23. ANDERSON § 7.23, 538; State ex rel. Saveland Holding Corp. v. Wieland, 269 Wisc. 262, 69
N.W.2d 217, cert. denied, 350 U.S. 841 (1955); Reid v. Architectural Board of Review, 119 Ohio
App. 67, 192 N.E.2d 74 (1963); General Outdoor Advertising Co. v. Dept. of Pub. Works, 289
Mass. 149, 193 N.E. 799, appeal dismissed sub nom. General Outdoor Advertising Co. v. Callahan,
296 U.S. 534 (1935).
"The Board shall disapprove the application it determines the proposed structures will
constitute an unsightly, grotesque or unsuitable in appearance, detrimental to the welfare of
surrounding property or residents." 458 S.W.2d at 309-10.
24. A possible explanation for the lack of litigation may be that many of the ordinance were
enacted with persuasion rather than enforcement in mind. Anderson, Architectural Controls, 12
SYRACUSE L. REv. 26,43 (1960).
25. West Palm Beach v. State ex rel. Duffy, 158 Fla. 863, 30 So.2d 491 (1947), held that a
requirement that all new buildings "substantially equal" existing construction in "appearance,
square foot area and height" did not provide sufficient standards. In Hawkins v. Borough of
Rockleigh, 55 N.J. Super, 132, 150 A.2d 63 (1959), an ordinance requiring all new houses to be of
"early American" design was struck down as clearly unreasonable and arbitrary in light of the
actual physical development of the municipality in question. More recently, Pacesetter Homes, Inc.,
v. Village of Olympia Fields, 104 I11. App.2d 218, 244 N.E.2d 369 (1968), voided an ordinance
which gave the Building Commissioner and the Architectural Advisory Committee authority to
disapprove any applications which they believed might cause any of several "bad effects" in the
community. Also, Berkeley, apart from the enabling act question, distinguishes Henze on thehttps://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1971/iss1/6
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jurisdictions which, before Berkeley, expressly upheld architectural
controls incorporated, at least to some extent, the property standard.
State ex rel. Saveland Holding Corp. v. Wieland,26 the first case to
uphold an architectural control ordinance on other than historical or
touristic grounds, is based totally on the effect of aesthetic regulation on
property values. The Wisconsin ordinance provided that the Building
Board determine whether proposed structures would substantially
depreciate property values.27 The court held that the Board's discretion
in deciding whether a proposed building would injure property values
was a sufficient standard.
Reid v. Architectural Board of Reviewze combined the protection of
property values with other objectives. Mrs. Reid, the plaintiff, wished to
construct a house of radical design in a district of two-story conventional
dwellings, but was denied a building permit. The Board was limited in its
discretion to accomplishment of three purposes: first, to protect the
property on which the building was to be constructed; second, to
maintain a high standard of community development; and, third, to
protect real estate from impairment or destruction of value. 29 The court
held these standards to be sufficient, but did not distinguish among
them. Thus, it is difficult in Reid to assess the role of the property value
standard. It might be significant, though, that without the provisions for
property value protection, the only remaining standard would be the
rather vague "high standard of community development."
Judge Corrigan, dissenting in Reid,30 disagrees with the factual finding
that property values would be impaired by the proposed residence, and
therefore disapproves of the result on the grounds that the municipality's
regulatory power cannot be exercised for aesthetic reasons alone. He
implies that if the Board's decision actually based on a threat to
property values, he would uphold the result. 31
grounds that the Ladue ordinances, unlike the ordinance reviewed in Henze, contain adequate
standards.
26. 269 Wis. 262, 69 N.W.2d 217, cert. denied, 350 U.S. 841 (1955).
27. Id. at 265, 69 N.W.2d at 219.
28. 119 Ohio App. 67, 192 N.E.2d 74 (1963).
29. Id. at 68, 192 N.E.2d at 76.
30. Id. at71, 192 N.E.2d at 78.
31. "Therefore, the question presented. . . is: does the Board have the right to prohibit a citizen
from building a house that does not conform to the other houses in the neighborhood ... on
aesthetic considerations alone, where the design and plans of such house meet the zoning and
building requirements and will not threaten, endanger, or impair the public health, safety, or
welfare, and will not impair property values in the neighborhood." Id. at 745, 192 N.E.2d at 80.
Judge Corrigan also considers the basic social question: "Should her (appellant's) aesthetic
[Vol. 1971:118
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Berkeley, instead of upholding the constitutionality of purely aesthetic
regulation,3 2 follows Wieland and Reid by making the validity of
architectural control legislation contingent on the protection of property
values. This approach does indeed provide an operable test for limiting
aesthetic restrictions on the use of property.3 It is questionable, however,
whether the protection of property values is a desireable, or even an
effective, standard for architectural control. The real purpose of
architectural control ordinances is to beautify the community, not to
enrich property owners. u Moreover, the protection of property values
does not necessarily insure the enhancement of community appearance.3
The property value standard is undoubtedly convenient, but there is no
reason to suppose that manageable standards based directly on the
aesthetic principle in question cannot be developed, 3 especially since
liberation of aesthetics from property values would provide a sound
basis for comprehensive community aesthetic planning which in turn
would serve as a foundation for judicial review.3 7
sensibilities in connection with her selection of design for her proposed home be stifled because of
the apparent belief in this community of the group as a source of creativity." Id. at 76, 192 N.E.2d
at 81. See also cases cited note 22 supra.
32. New York and Oregon have so held, see cases cited note 17 supra.
33. See Comment, Zoning, Aesthetics, and the First Amendment, 64 COLUM. L. REV. 81, 92-93
(1964).
34. See Note, Aesthetic Zoning: A Current Evaluation of the Law, 18 U. FLA. L. REv. 430,439
(1965).
35. Comment, Aesthetic Control of Land Use: A House Built Upon the Sand?, 59 Nw. U.L.
REV. 372, 389 (1964).
36. See Anderson, Architectural Controls, 12 SYRACUSE L. REv. 26,45 (1960).
37. See id. 48.
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